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A Portfolio View of the 
U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit
FROM 1971 TO 1982 THE U.S. current account balance as a share of U.S.
GNP averaged roughly zero.1 Starting in 1983, however, the United States
experienced increasingly large current account deficits, which reached
3.3 percent and 3.4 percent of GNP in 1986 and 1987, respectively. This
tendency toward larger deficits was reversed gradually during the rest of
the decade, and by 1991 the current account was near zero again. But start-
ing in 1993 the current account again began to record increasingly large
deficits, which grew to 3.6 percent of GNP in 1999 and 4.4 percent in
2000. This history of the current account prompts several questions: What
is the source of the large current account deficits of the 1990s? Are they
likely to remain with us indeﬁnitely? If not, should we expect them to fade
away slowly as they did in the 1980s? Or should we expect instead a sharp
reversal in the near future?
In this essay I interpret these trends in the U.S. current account from
a perspective that focuses on the behavior of the country portfolio. The
country portfolio is defined as the sum of all productive assets located in
the United States, plus the U.S. net foreign asset position (that is, the
sum of all claims on foreign assets held by U.S. residents minus the sum
of all claims on U.S. assets owned by foreign residents). By the composi-
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in it.2 According to the portfolio view, it is useful to separate changes in
the current account into two components: changes in the size of the coun-
try portfolio, which I call portfolio growth effects, and changes in the
composition of the country portfolio, or portfolio rebalancing effects. A
simple application of this approach reveals a clear picture: the recent
current account deficits are mostly the manifestation of the spectacular
increase in U.S. wealth experienced in the 1990s. Contrary to a widely
held belief, these deficits do not reflect a rebalancing of portfolios toward
U.S. assets and away from foreign assets.
A natural question follows: Why did U.S. wealth increase so much in
the 1990s? I explore two alternative hypotheses. The first views the
increase in wealth as reﬂecting a rapid accumulation of an intangible form
of capital. The second is based on the notion that the 1990s were charac-
terized by the appearance and growth of a bubble in the U.S. stock mar-
ket. Although both explanations exhibit interesting elements, neither is
fully satisfactory. Our inability to account for the growth in wealth makes
the task of predicting the future direction of the U.S. current account quite
difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, each of these stories has a dif-
ferent ending, and I discuss them below.3
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2. A simple example helps in understanding the implications of this deﬁnition. Suppose
that Daimler buys Chrysler and pays Chrysler shareholders in cash, which they then use to
build a new hotel in Las Vegas. This transaction does not affect U.S. net worth or the size
of the U.S. portfolio. But it does change its composition, according to my definition. In
particular, there is an increase in U.S. productive assets (since Chrysler’s facilities are still
in the United States, and so is the hotel), which is financed by selling claims on U.S. pro-
ductive assets (since the United States must now pay the German owners of Daimler the
return to the Chrysler facilities). In my view, the fact that the claim that the United States has
sold is a contingent one does not invalidate the proposition that the United States has lever-
aged itself in order to buy more U.S. productive assets. If the Chrysler shareholders had used
the cash to buy German public bonds instead of a Las Vegas hotel, neither the size nor the
composition of the U.S. portfolio would have changed, in my deﬁnition. There would have
been an increase in claims on foreign assets held by the United States (since Germany
must now use part of its productive assets to pay interest to U.S. bondholders), ﬁnanced by
selling claims on U.S. productive assets.
3. A third story is provided by McGrattan and Prescott (2001), who argue that the
increase in wealth is due to changes in taxes and regulations and, in particular, to a reduction
in the dividend tax.
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The point of departure for a portfolio view of the current account is
the celebrated mean-variance theory of Harry Markowitz and James
Tobin.4According to this theory, investors choose their portfolios by opti-
mally trading off risk and return. The optimal or mean-variance-efficient
portfolio contains the risk-free asset and an optimal combination of risky
assets (OCRA). A strong result of the theory is that the OCRA is the same
for all investors with access to the same menu of assets, regardless of
their attitudes toward risk and their level of wealth. That is, the share of
each asset in the OCRA depends only on the distribution of asset returns.
Another strong result of the theory is that the weights that mean-variance
investors assign to the risk-free asset and the OCRA depend only on their
risk aversion and the distribution of asset returns. They do not depend on
the investors’wealth.5
Moving from the optimal investor portfolio to the average or country
portfolio requires an additional assumption, namely, that the average risk
aversion and the distribution of asset returns are both independent of
wealth. This is a strong assumption, and its validity is an empirical issue
that is far from settled. I shall nevertheless adopt it. This assumption is use-
ful here because it ensures that the properties of individual investors’port-
folios also apply to the average or country portfolio. Thus, changes in
wealth affect only the size of the country portfolio but do not inﬂuence its
composition or asset shares. The latter changes only with changes in risk
aversion or in the distribution of asset returns.
This portfolio view leads to a sharp and simple rule to predict the
response of the current account to changes in wealth. Define Wt and NFAt
as the wealth and the net foreign asset position of the country, respectively.
Let Xt be the share of net foreign assets in the country portfolio, Xt =
NFAt/Wt. Since Xt is not affected by changes in wealth, the fraction of any
change in wealth that is allocated to net foreign assets equals the share of
foreign assets in the country portfolio:
() . 1 ∆∆ NFA X W tt t =
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5. These results apply in more general models if preferences are homothetic and returns
are log-normally distributed. See, for instance, Merton (1971).
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same way as the average unit. This is a simple rule for predicting the
effects of changes in wealth on the net foreign asset position, in the
absence of changes in the distribution of asset returns. That is, equation 1
measures the extent to which a change in the net foreign asset position is
a manifestation of changes in the size of the country portfolio, or port-
folio growth.
A useful approximation to equation 1 applies if asset price revalua-
tions are not too large. Let St and CAt denote gross national saving and
the current account, respectively. If asset price revaluations (which are
included in ∆Wt and ∆NFAt but not in St and CAt) are not too large, gross
national saving and the current account are good measures of actual
changes in wealth and net foreign assets. As a result, we can approximate
equation 1 as follows:
This relationship should hold in samples of countries where there is
substantial cross-sectional and time variation in saving rates but the dis-
tribution of asset returns is quite stable over time. Perhaps surprisingly,
Aart Kraay and I found that this is the case in a sample of thirteen indus-
trial countries from 1973 to 1995.6 Since the share of foreign assets in the
portfolios of these countries is typically small, this simple rule is also
consistent with the celebrated finding of Martin Feldstein and Charles
Horioka that saving and investment move almost one to one in a cross
section of countries.7
Although the theoretical foundations of this portfolio view of the cur-
rent account are quite standard, its implications are somewhat surprising
and even counterintuitive compared with those of existing theories. To
see this, consider the effects of an increase in saving due to, say, a pro-
duction boom, diminished expectations about the future, a reduction in
taxes, or an increase in population growth. The traditional view is that at
least part of this additional saving should be invested abroad, leading to
an increase in the current account surplus. Instead, the new view embed-
() . 2 CA X S tt t ≈
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6. Kraay and Ventura (2000). The sample consists of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
7. Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
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proportions as in the existing country portfolio, leading to an increase in
the current account surplus in creditor countries (Xt > 0) and a decrease in
debtor countries (Xt < 0).
Equation 2 describes the response of the current account to movements
in saving, but these are not the only source of variation in the current
account. Changes in the distribution of asset returns constitute another
important source of current account movements. To see this, consider an
increase in the expected return to domestic capital due to, say, a techno-
logical breakthrough, a change in political leadership, or a reduction in
capital income taxes. Both the traditional and the portfolio views of the
current account would predict that investors will react to this change by
rebalancing their portfolios toward domestic capital and away from for-
eign assets. Since equation 2 describes the current account surplus that
keeps the share of foreign assets in the country portfolio constant, this
rebalancing can only be achieved by running a smaller current account sur-
plus than predicted by this equation. Therefore deviations between the
actual current account and the current account predicted by equation 2
can be interpreted as a manifestation of changes in the composition of the
country portfolio, or portfolio rebalancing.
Portfolio Growth or Portfolio Rebalancing?
A common view is that the large U.S. current account deficits of the
1990s reﬂected a favorable shift in the distribution of returns to U.S. assets
relative to foreign assets. This shift is attributed to various causes. Some
argue that increased total factor productivity (TFP) growth has raised the
expected return to U.S. capital. Others argue that financial turmoil in
emerging markets has made relatively safe U.S. assets look more attrac-
tive. Whether it is productivity growth or the increased need for a safe
haven, there is a growing perception that the recent behavior of the U.S.
current account reﬂects mostly portfolio rebalancing.
A straightforward application of equation 2 seems to confirm this per-
ception. Figure 1 plots the actual current account and the current account
predicted by equation 2. Over the last thirty years there have been two
episodes in which the predicted current account surplus grossly overesti-
mates the actual one. The first episode is centered in the mid-1980s, and
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cluded. The 1980s episode is not a surprise at all. We can easily attribute
it to the high U.S. interest rates that resulted from combining tight mone-
tary policy with large fiscal deficits. The international debt crisis that
erupted in 1982 must also have contributed to increased demand for U.S.
assets in this period. One is tempted to conclude that the 1990s episode is
nothing but a repetition of that of the 1980s. Instead of high U.S. interest
rates, in the 1990s we had rapid TFP growth in the United States. Instead
of a developing country debt crisis, in the 1990s we had a flurry of cur-
rency crises in emerging markets. The parallels are too obvious to be
missed.
But this sensation of déjà vu is just an illusion. Remember that equa-
tion 2 was shown to be a valid approximation to the theory if and only if
asset price revaluations are not too large. This is certainly not a good
assumption for the 1990s episode. From the end of 1992 to the end of
1999, cumulative gross national saving was $8.7 trillion, whereas the
increase in the market value of the U.S. capital stock was roughly $40 tril-
lion. That is, gross national saving captured slightly over 20 percent of
the actual increase in wealth. It follows that equation 2 is underpredicting
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Figure 1. Actual and Predicted U.S. Current Account Balance, 1970–99
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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almost ﬁve. Nothing of the sort happened during the 1980s.8
A natural way to correct for this disconnect between saving and wealth
changes is to go back to equation 1. Figure 2 plots the actual change in
net foreign assets and the change in net foreign assets predicted by equa-
tion 1. The 1980s episode of portfolio rebalancing is clearly visible. From
1980 to 1992 the change in net foreign assets was consistently below the
level required to keep the share of foreign assets constant. But the 1990s
episode has all but disappeared. In fact, in 1998 and 1999 there seems to
have been a rebalancing of portfolios away from U.S. assets. Figure 3
shows that the share of foreign assets declined by roughly 4.8 percentage
points from 1980 to 1992, but declined by less than 0.5 percentage point
from 1992 to 1999.
The picture that emerges from the portfolio view of the current account
is slowly coming into focus. In the 1990s U.S. investors enjoyed very large
returns to their wealth in the form of asset price revaluation. Rather than
spend these returns, U.S. investors largely decided to keep them and buy
domestic and foreign assets roughly in the same proportions as their aver-
age portfolio. Since the average portfolio is short in foreign assets, this
means that the United States leveraged itself more, so that it could invest
in domestic assets beyond the increase in wealth. Hence the large current
account deﬁcits.
At best, this picture can be interpreted as a partial explanation. At worst,
we can think of it as posing a set of still-unanswered questions: Why were
the returns to U.S. wealth in the 1990s so high? Why did these returns take
the form of asset price revaluation rather than increased production? (Or,
in other words, why did the wealth-to-output ratio increase so much?) Why
did U.S. investors save most of these returns rather than use them to
increase their consumption? Why did they choose not to rebalance their
portfolios toward U.S. assets at a time when the latter were yielding such
high returns? I do not claim to have foolproof answers to these questions.
Nobody really does. But I am willing to speculate.
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8. Remember that the portfolio view of the current account explains how a large increase
in saving can lead to a large current account deﬁcit in a debtor country like the United States.
This is a major difference with the traditional view, which predicts that an increase in sav-
ing of this magnitude should have generated large current account surpluses. See Kraay
and Ventura (2000).
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Figure 2. Actual and Predicted Change in U.S. Net Foreign Assets, 1970–99
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, and
Herman (2000).













Figure 3. Share of U.S. Net Foreign Assets in the Country Portfolio, 1970–99
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, and
Herman (2000).
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A first explanation for the increase in the wealth-to-output ratio relies
on improved expectations of the future of the U.S. economy. According
to this view, the increase in asset prices measures upward revisions of
future production based on economic fundamentals. One might immedi-
ately counter that the measured capital stock (and hence the productive
capacity of the U.S. economy) has increased at roughly the same rate as
production and at a much slower pace than wealth. Nevertheless, it is also
possible that in the 1990s the United States accumulated intangible or
organizational capital. This type of capital might not increase production
immediately but can be expected to raise the productive capacity of the
U.S. economy in the near future. Robert Hall has forcefully argued this
view and has coined the term e-capital to refer to this form of intangible
asset.9
One difficulty with this story is linked to the behavior of saving and
interest rates. If the future looks so rosy, Americans should start consum-
ing more right now. Since the additional goods to be consumed will not
come until later, however, attempts to consume right now should drive
interest rates up, lowering asset prices and curbing the growth in wealth.
The accumulation of e-capital can affect wealth if and only if investors
are willing to save more at given interest rates. The e-capital story must
therefore be complemented by an explanation of the factors that led to an
increase in saving during the 1990s.10 One could argue that the increase
in saving is due to the arrival of baby-boomers at that stage of the life cycle
(late thirties and early forties) when people typically start saving for retire-
ment. One could also point out that much of the increase in wealth has
gone into the hands of rich investors, who are likely to have a lower than
average propensity to consume out of their wealth.11 Or it could be that
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10. It is a well-publicized fact that U.S. household saving has declined to the point that
it is now negative. This should not, however, obscure the fact that there has been an increase
in total saving (by a couple of percentage points of GDP) during the 1990s, as increases in
corporate and government saving more than offset the decline in household saving. But
these measures of saving do not take into account the income that comes from asset price
revaluations. When this is done, one cannot escape the conclusion that saving increased sub-
stantially during the 1990s.
11. I thank Kenneth Rogoff for pointing this out to me.
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their consumption very slowly. In any case, whether some combination of
these factors can explain the increase in saving in the 1990s remains to be
determined.
A second difﬁculty with the e-capital story is how to reconcile the view
that investments in e-capital are highly productive with the absence of a
strong rebalancing of the U.S. country portfolio. If e-capital is so produc-
tive, the expected return to U.S. capital should have increased, convinc-
ing investors to rebalance their portfolios toward U.S. assets and away
from foreign assets. As figure 2 shows, this has not happened, and the
e-capital story must come to grips with this observation. There are vari-
ous ways to do this. One possible argument is that there are strong dimin-
ishing returns to e-capital. In this view the first wave of investments in
e-capital yielded rich rewards. The second wave is unlikely to yield such
high returns, and as a result there is no incentive to rebalance portfolios
toward U.S. capital. A second possible argument would recognize that
e-capital has indeed raised the expected return to U.S. capital, but would
then point out that it has also increased the expected return to foreign
capital. This suggests, too, there is no incentive to rebalance portfolios
toward U.S. capital.
Subject to these caveats, the e-capital story provides a consistent
account of the main macroeconomic events of the 1990s. If the story is
correct, the future of the current account is intimately linked to the pat-
tern of saving in the United States and the time it takes for production to
increase. If the factors behind the increase in saving remain in force until
expectations of increased future production are realized, we should expect
a continuation of the current pattern of high saving and corresponding cur-
rent account deficits. If instead the factors behind the increase in saving
weaken before the expectations of increased future production are real-
ized, we should expect an increase in interest rates, a contraction in wealth,
and current account surpluses.
At the end of the day, however, the most damaging evidence against
the e-capital story is the recent decline in the U.S. stock market. It is dif-
ficult to justify this decline by citing the increase in interest rates of
around 1 percentage point (which, in any case, has been recently
reversed). It is still more difficult to justify this increase in interest rates
by a decline in aggregate saving. Still, one could argue that the recent
decline in stock prices reflects a large negative revision of the value of
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want to be in the position of having to explain what this news and these
fundamentals might be.
The Dot-Com Bubble
A second explanation of the increase in the wealth-to-output ratio is
based on the idea that the 1990s witnessed the appearance of a bubble or
Ponzi scheme in the U.S. stock market. In such an environment, investors
buy stocks because they expect to resell them later at a higher price, rather
than because they have revised upward their expectations of firms’ prof-
its. The price appreciation must be high enough to compensate for the pos-
sibility of not ﬁnding a buyer. In other words, the higher the risk of a crash,
the higher is the growth rate of stock prices. During this episode the link
between changes in asset prices and those of their fundamental value is
broken. Eventually, buyers are no longer found and the bubble bursts.
Since this bubble has been more evident for high-technology and Internet-
related ﬁrms, I refer to it as the dot-com bubble.
At first sight, the notion of a bubble underlying the fast growth of the
1990s might seem counterintuitive to economists. In existing models,12
bubbles (or unproductive assets) provide investors with an alternative sav-
ings vehicle that competes with productive capital. These models therefore
predict that the appearance of a bubble should be associated with a reduc-
tion in the stock of capital and production. This description stands in stark
contrast with the experience of the 1990s, where both the capital stock and
production increased at a rapid pace. If we want to attribute the develop-
ments of the 1990s to the appearance of a bubble, we must first explain
how this bubble can foster capital accumulation rather than hinder it, as it
does in existing models.
A key assumption of the classic models of bubbles is that investors are
risk-neutral and, consequently, that bubbles must offer the same expected
return as productive capital. Since there is a probability that a bubble will
burst, this return must exceed that of productive capital for as long as the
bubble does not burst. The return on the bubble must also exceed the return
on the investor’s overall portfolio (which is a combination of bubble and
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tion, the bubble grows continuously and crowds out productive capital in
the investor’s portfolio. Investors are willing to accept this change in the
composition of their portfolios because they are risk-neutral and perceive
the bubble and productive capital as perfect substitutes.
Assume instead that investors are risk-averse and choose to hold mean-
variance-efficient portfolios. Remember that a key characteristic of these
portfolios is that asset shares are independent of wealth. This has impor-
tant implications for the relationship between the bubble and productive
capital. As the bubble grows, so does the wealth of the investor. This
induces investors to buy more productive capital so as to keep the shares of
their portfolios constant. This means more productive investment and
higher growth in the stock of capital and output. In a world of mean-
variance investors, bubbles and the stock of capital are complements rather
than substitutes. In such a world, the appearance of a bubble can generate
a boom in productive investment and output.13
This dot-com bubble story easily gets around the problems of the
e-capital story. It can explain why U.S. investors saved most of their
increase in wealth, and why they decided not to rebalance their portfolios
toward U.S. assets. Both choices are nothing but natural reactions to the
increased risk generated by the possibility of the bubble bursting. High risk
encourages investors to save as a precautionary measure and can there-
fore explain the shift in saving behavior. High risk also induces investors
to require higher rates of return on U.S. assets and can therefore explain
why there has not been a rebalancing of investor portfolios toward U.S.
assets. 
The dot-com bubble story is harder to rule out than the e-capital story.
But I do not regard this as a merit. To the contrary, it mostly reflects how
vague the theory still is regarding its implications. For instance, should
we expect the whole bubble to burst in a single installment, or to deflate
gradually? As the bubble bursts, what will happen to the market value of
productive ﬁrms? What sorts of events would trigger the birth and the death
252 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
13. I have recently formalized this model of “expansionary” bubbles; see Ventura (2001).
Caballero and Hammour (2001) have simultaneously developed two alternative models of
“expansionary” bubbles. In their ﬁrst model, the bubble arises in the stock of capital itself,
and hence productive investment is pulled upward by the bubble. In their second model,
the complementarity between the bubble and conventional capital arises from externalities
in production.
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to these questions.
Despite this ignorance, it is still relatively straightforward to predict the
effects of a bursting of the bubble on the current account. Remember that
this event would generate a reduction in aggregate wealth and saving.
Since the United States is a debtor country, this would in turn generate a
reduction in the current account deficit. If the burst is quick and violent,
the United States might experience a sharp reversal, in which the current
account goes into surplus. If the burst is slow and protracted, the current
account deficit will simply decline and remain close to zero. In the after-
math I would expect the current account to register moderate deﬁcits as the
growth rate of wealth returns to prebubble levels.
APPENDIX
Data Sources
I OBTAINED DATA for the U.S. current account, international investment
position (or net foreign asset position), gross national product, and gross
domestic investment from the World Wide Web site of the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). I computed gross national saving as the current
account plus gross domestic investment.
To obtain estimates of U.S. wealth, I took an initial value for the capi-
tal stock in 1950.14 This source is also available on the BEA website. This
initial stock is divided into three components: private nonresidential, pri-
vate residential, and government. I then cumulated flows of investment,
assuming a rate of depreciation of 4 percent and revaluating existing stocks
using the appropriate investment deflator for private residential and gov-
ernment components, but using a share price index for the private nonres-
idential component. This procedure generated a series for the U.S. stock of
capital. Then U.S. wealth is obtained as the sum of the domestic stock of
capital and the international investment position.
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